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Abstract: Taking note of the wide variety and growing list of models in the literature to 
explain patterns of behavior observed in laboratory experiments, this paper identifies two 
tests, the Variety Test (ability of a model to explain outcomes under variety or alternative 
scenarios) and the Psychological Test (ability of a model to conform to psychological 
intuition), that can be used to judge any model of other-regarding behavior. It is argued 
that for a mathematical model to qualify as a social welfare function, it must 
simultaneously pass the two tests. It is shown that none of the models proposed to date 
passes these two tests simultaneously. The paper proposes a generalized model of 
inequity aversion which parsimoniously explains interior solution in the dictator game 
and dynamics of outcomes in other games. The paper postulates that one’s idea of 
equitable distribution is state-dependent, where the state is determined by psychological 
and structural parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a 
fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state 
have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as 
equitable distribution. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, every 
experimental design/structure assigns one of the three states to players which lead to 
individual-specific valuation of equity. Prediction about outcomes across different 
experiments and designs can be made through predicting their impact on equity-bias. All 
aspects of an individual’s behavior, such as altruism, fairness, reciprocity, self-serving 
bias, kindness, intentions etc, manifest themselves in the equity-bias. The model therefore 
is all-encompassing. 
 
Key Words: Experimental Economics, Social Preferences, Other-regarding Preferences, 
Inequity aversion. 
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1. Introduction: 
Economic agents are typically modeled as self-regarding selfish beings whose welfare is 
unaffected by welfare of others in society. There have been long concerns about validity 
of the self-regarding assumption and calls to take other-regarding preferences seriously 
in economic theorizing. This assumption has heavily been under attack in recent years 
and efforts to take other-regarding preferences seriously escalated due to laboratory 
experiments in behavioral economics, particularly the dictator game experiment. These 
experiments suggest that individuals value fairness and most, if not all, behave 
altruistically and when allowed to do so, some sacrifice their self-interest to supposedly 
punish unfairness. This, naturally, led theoretical economists to look for theories that 
could explain the sort of behavior exhibited by subjects in these experiments. The main 
focus of this area of research has been to identify other-regarding individual specific 
utility, or social welfare, functions that could explain patterns of behavior, such as 
fairness and reciprocity, observed in data from laboratory experiments. Literature in this 
area is expanding rapidly and so is the variety of proposed models. These models include 
linear models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Charness and Rabin (2002), Levine (1998), 
Rotemberg (2004), and Erlei (2004), and nonlinear models by Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000), Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad (2004), Ottone and Ponzano (2005), Cox, and 
Friedman and Gjerstad (2007).  
 
Noting that altering the utility function allows one to explain just anything, Camerer 
(2003, p 101) writes 
 
“The goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility function 
just so; the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, supported by 
psychological intuition, that are general enough to explain many phenomena in one 
fell swoop, and also make new predictions” 
 
Models proposed in this area of research however haven’t been subjected to any formal 
tests to analyze their ability to explain many phenomenon in one fell swoop and ensure 
their conformity to psychological intuition. This paper formalizes Camerer’s idea in the 
form of two tests that can be used to judge models of other-regarding preferences. The 
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two tests are (i) the Variety test (V-Test) and (ii) the Psychological test (P-Test). This 
paper applies these tests to representative models of the literature and demonstrates that 
none of the models proposed to date passes these tests simultaneously. They fail to 
support psychological intuition when put to such a theoretical test, and most are not 
general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop and do well in experiments 
of specific designs only. The paper than proposes a generalized model of inequity 
aversion that passes the two tests simultaneously. This is done through introducing 
equity-bias in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model with some other generalization. In the 
Fehr and Schmidt’s model, individuals are inequality averse. This paper highlights the 
difference between inequity and inequality. It argues that one’s idea of an equitable 
distribution is state-dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural 
parameters. The state could be fair, superior or inferior. Individuals in a fair state have 
zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a superior (inferior) state have positive 
(negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than fair distribution as equitable 
distribution. i.e. bias in state leads to bias, not necessarily with the negative connotation,  
in equity. Given psychological tendencies of an individual, every experimental design 
assigns a state to the player which leads individual specific valuation of equity. The 
model is developed in a two-player environment but results are applicable to games with 
multiple players competing or otherwise.  
 
Before going into details of the two tests, let me point out that this paper will limit its 
discussion to the two most frequently used standard games, namely, the dictator game 
(DG) and the ultimatum game (UG). In the DG, a player called the dictator is given a 
certain amount of money with the option to share it with another player, the recipient, in 
any proportion, 0 to 100 percent, inclusive. In the UG, the dictator is lowered to the status 
of a proposer and the recipient is alleviated to the status of a responder who is allowed to 
either accept or reject a distribution proposed by the proposer. When accepted, each 
player keeps his/her share and when rejected both players get zero. 
 
(i) The Variety Test (V-Test): 
Variety of the laboratory experiments conducted in this area has grown richer and 
different versions of the games have been experimented with. A reasonable model 
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should be general enough to perform consistently across (i) different designs of the 
same game (e.g. across different versions of the dictator game) and (ii) across 
different games of the same nature (e.g. across the dictator, ultimatum and impunity 
games). This test has been applied, not under the name V-test though, in the literature, 
as we will note in our discussion later.  
 
(ii) The Psychological Test (P-Test): 
As mentioned earlier, the main focus of the models in this area of research has been 
to explain patterns of the behavior observed during laboratory experiments. Whether 
or not a mathematical model that is able to explain outcomes in laboratory 
experiments conforms to psychological intuition is something that is often ignored 
and not tested for. The question however to ask is, is there any such test that can be 
used, together with some other test(s), to give a mathematical model the status of an 
other-regarding welfare function? Fortunately, there is at least one, Sen’s Weak 
Equity Axiom. Think of two individuals, one normal and the other with a disability. 
The disabled person is less efficient in converting a dollar into utility relative to the 
normal person. Psychological intuition tells us that when distributing a given sum, 
one should be more altruistic towards the disabled person than towards the normal 
person. This is Sen’s Weak Equity Axiom1. Conformity to Sen’s WEA can be 
checked through the sign of the partial derivative of equilibrium pay-offs with respect 
to dollar-to-utility conversion efficiency of a player. 
 
Formally, let Vi=Vi(u(xi),u(xj/) be the social utility of an individual i where xi is the 
pay-off of an individual i,  u(xi) the selfish utility of i from xi, xj is the pay-off of 
individual  j and u(xj/ the selfish utility of individual j from xj.  quantifies the 
inefficiency of individual j in converting xj into utility relative to i. The larger the 
value of  the less efficient j is in converting a dollar into utility. The player’s 
objective is to maximize Vi subject to a constraint (such as xi+xj=N where N is size 
of the pie). Let xi* and xj* be the equilibrium pay-offs after maximization. Sen’s 
WEA requires d(xj*)/d>0.  
                                                 
1 The disability can be interpreted in general as poor socio-economic status. 
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In fact the P-test can be thought of as a special case of the V-test. Experiments show 
that Sen’s WEA is satisfied. Garza (2006) performed three different dictator games; 
the standard dictator game and two versions of the dictator game with poverty where 
the dictator is informed that their recipients were poor. Garza found that giving in the 
poverty game was significantly higher than in the standard dictator game.  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section  2 provides a review of selected 
models representative of previous literature and evaluates the performance of the models 
against the V-test and the P-test. Section  3 provides a discussion on equity vs equality 
and spells out the concept of equity-bias. Section  4 formally introduces the state-
dependent/equity-bias model of inequity aversion. This section details dynamics of the 
model in the dictator and ultimatum games. Section  5 discusses application of the model 
to different versions of the dictator and ultimatum games experiments conducted in the 
literature. Finally, Section  6 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Review of Previous Models: 
This section reviews selected models of other-regarding preferences. These models 
include The FS model (Fehr and Schmidt (1999)), the BO model (Bolton and Ockenfels 
2000) and the CFG model (Cox, and Friedman and Gjerstad 2007). The following 
justifies selection of the models in this section. 
 
The model in this paper is primarily an extension of the FS model. The paper therefore 
starts the review with the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model which is representative of 
piecewise linear models of inequality aversion. Results of the analysis therefore apply to 
any model with inequity modeled as inequality, such as Charness and Rabin (2002) and Erlei 
(2004). Appendix A demonstrates as an example that the FS model, or a restricted version of 
it, can be derived as a monotonic transformation of Charness and Rabin (2002). The same 
can be done for other piecewise linear models of the same sort.  
 
As well known, the FS model cannot explain interior solutions in the dictator game. Fehr 
and Schmidt attribute this flaw to the piecewise linearity of preferences in advantageous 
inequity. They claimed that modifying their social welfare function to introduce non-
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linearity in the advantageous inequity could resolve the issue (Fehr and Schmidt 1999 p. 
823). The BO model can be shown to be the FS model with the proposed non-linearity. 
This is the reason why this model is reviewed as well and will be analyzed in the next 
section. Although I do not review other nonlinear models, the criticism in this paper is 
also applicable to other nonlinear models such as Ottone and Ponzano (2005). 
 
Finally, most recently, Cox et al (2007) proposed a parametric model of other-regarding 
preferences which depends on status, reciprocity, and perceived property rights. This 
allowed them to make distribution conditional on status, unlike the unconditional 
distributional preferences in the FS type models. Cox et al (2007) notes a number of 
recent experiments which compare explanatory power of earlier models, arguing that a 
large majority of subjects make choices that are inconsistent with unconditional 
inequality aversion.  
 
Apart from the distributional preference models above, as mentioned by Cox et al (2007), 
there are alternative models of intention-based reciprocity such as Rabin (1993), 
Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004) and Falk and Fischbacher (2001). These alternative 
models are complex and have many equilibria, and so seem intractable in most 
applications (Cox. et al 2007). Although I do not review intention-based models, the 
model proposed in this paper captures dynamics generated by intentions and 
encompasses this class of models as well. The analysis on Fehr and Schmidt (1999) in 
this section also applies to Levine (1998) who developed a simple tractable model with 
intentions where utilities are linear in one’s own and the other’s pay-offs. 
 
2.1.  The FS (Fehr and Schmidt 1999) model: 
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) used a simple linear model to explain results of laboratory 
experiments including the dictator and ultimatum games. They modeled fairness as 
self-centered inequity- in fact inequality- aversion, whereby people are willing to 
sacrifice part of their material pay-offs to move in the direction of equality. Assuming 
two players in the game, their social welfare function of an individual i is linearly 
increasing in self-pay-off, xi, and decreasing in advantageous inequality, xi-xj. i.e. 
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    ,0 ,0            0 1   and  i i i i j i j i i iV x max x x max x x i            (1) 
 
i  is the social marginal utility when disadvantageous inequality ( ) reduces 
by 1 unit. Similarly, 
0i jx x 
i  is the social marginal utility when advantageous 
inequality( ) decreases by 1 unit. 0i jx x  i i   implies that a unit increase in 
disadvantageous inequality hurts i more than a unit increase in advantageous inequality 
would.  
 
Consider application of the model to the DG. Assuming D and R to be pay-offs of the 
dictator and recipient respectively, we can write social utility of the dictator, based on 
equation (1), as: 
 
   max ,0 max ,0D D DV D D R R D       
 
The dictator’s objective it to maximizes VD subject to D+R=N. Figure 1 plots VD at 
different values of D .  The following holds 
 
D
D
D
D
       when  0
       when 0.5         C D  
        when 0.5          
        when 0.5         F
D
ABC
ABD E
V
ABE
ABF E




      

 
 
Let  and  denote the values of D and R where *D *R DV   is maximum.  The solution is 
easy to work out from the graph. 
 
           
   
   
      
 
D
D
D
1, 0                               when  0        point C
1, 0                               when 0.5      point D* *,
0.5,1 , 0.5, 0          when 0.5      line BE   
0.5, 0.5                  
D R
N N




      
 D      when 0.5       point B
 
 (2) 
 
Notice that the dictator solution in (2) is independent of the value of D .  
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 Figure 1: The FS model at different values of D  
C 0D DV  
0.5D   D 
 
The solution is either D*=N (with D 0.5  ), D*=N/2 (with D 0.5  ) or the range 
*
2
N D N   (with D 0.5  ) with indifference. The range is not an equilibrium in a 
strict sense. All it says is that any value within the range is equally good and welfare-
maximizing. The FS model can therefore only explain corner solutions (D=N and N/2) 
in the dictator game, leaving the interior unexplained. 
 
Now consider application of the model to the UG. Assuming P and R to be the pay-offs 
of the proposer and responder respectively, we can write the social utility of the 
proposer and responder, based on equation (1),  as: 
 
     max ,0 max ,0P P PV P P R R P         (3) 
and     max ,0 max ,0R R RV R R P P R         (4) 
 
The proposer’s objective is to maximize Vp subject to P+R=N and make an offer to the 
responder good enough to make the responder’s social utility non-negative, i.e. the 
proposer’s objective is therefore to maximize VR subject to P+R=N and  . This 
means that in the FS model responders are non-optimizers. They are happy so long as 
0RV 
O 
B 
F 
N 
E 0.5D 
0.5D 
450 
*
2
ND   * 2
NR   A 2
N
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their social utility is non-negative. 0RV   requires ,O iR r N  or  , ,1 o i o iD r N p N    
where  , 1 2Ro i Rr

    is the minimum acceptable offer by individual i
2. Since we may 
have individuals with different R  ( 0 RH R RH       ), corresponding to 
n the lower and upper bound will be accepted 
with certain probability. Offers below  will be rejected and those equal to or greater 
than  will be accepted with certainty. This is depicted in 
, , ,0 0o L o i o Hr r r    ,
,o Hr
.5  any offer withi
,o Lr
Figure 2. The following 
holds under different values of P when constraints are implemented: 
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Figure 2: Graphs of the FS model in the Ultimatum game.  
                                                 
2 This is derived as follows. Let  be the offer received by the responder, D=(1- ) and 
R= N. Substituting this V
,o ir
R
,o ir
,o ir 0  when P R , i.e. RR P  0R   gives  
 which implies the value of  , 2R R o ir r   , 0o i  ,o ir 1 2R R

  . 
O 
PV  
B 
C’ 
F’ 
N 
E’ 0 . 5P   
0P 
0 . 5P   
A 
2
N
0 . 5P   
450 
,O Lp N
D’ 
G 
P 
   
H 
I 
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The solution lies on the additional constraint 0RV   when P 0.5  , which implies an 
equilibrium offer ,
O
O iR r N , on the line BH with indifference when P 0.5  , and at 
point B when P 0.5  . The reason why the solution of P 0.5   excludes points on 
HE’ is that any offer on HE’ has some probability of rejection, as a result the individual 
with P 0.5   will not be indifferent between BH and HE’. BH will be preferred to 
HE’. 
   
   
 
, , , , P
, , P
P
, , ,       when 0.5
, 0.5, , 0.5,           when 0.5     line BHwith indifference   
0.5,0.5                                     when 0.5       
o L o H o L o H
O O
o H o H
p p r r
P R p r
N N



        
                point B

 (5) 
 
The solution in UG is similar to the one in the dictator game (compare equation (5) 
with (2) and Figure 2 with Figure 1). The only difference is that the corners are now 
determined by the additional constraint ,O iR r N  rather than R=0. Risk-averse proposers 
will choose to offer closer to  and risk lovers would offer close to . ,o Hr ,o Lr
 
Let us call P =0, selfish-regarding (SR), 0<P <0.5 not so SR or weakly other-
regarding (WOR), P=0.5 equal regarding (ER) and P >0.5 other-regarding (OR). The 
following conclusions inevitably follow from the FS model; 
a) If there was no fear of rejection at R=0, the solution according to Fehr and 
Schmidt’s formulation will be exactly the same as the dictator game, the corner 
solution. This leaves the interior solution unexplained.  
b) When there is fear of rejection the right corner solution on ,O iR r N   corresponds 
to 0 0.5P   and it is hard to distinguish between SR and WOR individuals. 
Thus this solution wouldn’t tell us whether preferences are weakly other-
regarding or selfish. 
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c) Knowing that an offer r=0.5 will never be rejected, the OR 0.5P   solution 
(r=0.5) can only be interpreted as an altruistic solution, which is again a corner 
solution similar to the OR dictator. 
d) Coming to the ER individual, the solution is again a range  ,0.5, O Hr    with 
indifference which is not a unique interior solution. 
 
What points (a) to (d) tell us is that, according to the FS model, a solution r=0.5 can be 
interpreted as a solution with altruism if , 0.5O Hr  , may possibly be interpreted as a 
solution with fear of rejection (reciprocity) if for some individuals . In the 
first case preferences can be termed as OR whereas in the second case they may or may 
not be. Given that in the standard dictator experiment an r>=0.5 is not always observed, 

, 0.5O Hr 
P>0.5 is not dominantly true. This means that the preferences of the proposer are 
either SR or WOR. i.e. 0 0.5P  . Since SR and WOR have the same solution, the 
use of other-regarding preferences is irrelevant. The problem with the ER solution is 
obvious. Indifference means any choice is equally good, which is not an explanation. 
Thus interior solutions in the UG in the FS model can be interpreted as belonging to a 
selfish (or WOR) proposer with non-optimizing responder. The UG solution of the FS 
model explains interior offers as a result of fear of rejection, leaving the altruistic part 
unexplained. 
 
Coming to application of the V-test and the P-test, the FS model does not withstand the 
V-test. Firstly, it fails to explain interior solutions in the DG. Secondly, it fails to 
explain outcomes across different designs of the UG. Camerer (2003, p. 112) mentions 
that if you modify the UG such that if a responder rejects an offer, 2 units are 
subtracted from all pay-offs, the model predicts that responders should never reject 
unequal offers. This is because rejection would reduce the pay-off of the responder 
without any effect on inequality. When individuals are inequality-averse in pay-offs the 
model automatically fails the P-test. However when we replace inequality aversion in 
pay-offs by inequality aversion in utility, the P-test is qualified for a special case of 
equal distribution of utility. This can be ascertained by replacing jx  in the FS model 
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with jx  in equation (1), which becomes a special case of the model (ei=1, implying 
equality in utility) in this paper and passes the P-test, as we shall see later. 
 
2.2.The BO (Bolton- Ockenfels 2000) Model: 
The social welfare function of an individual i in Bolton-Ockenfels model is given 
(ignoring the xi+xj=0 case) by 
 
  
2
1    0  and 0
2 2
i i
i i i i
i j
b xV ax a b
x x
        
 
 
As i jx x N  , it can be reduced to   
  
  228 ii i i jbV ax x xN     (6) 
 
Notice that Vi is linearly increasing in xi and non-linearly decreasing in inequity. Recall 
that Fehr and Schmidt (1999) blamed linearity of the social welfare function in 
advantageous inequity for the inability of their model to explain interior outcomes in 
the dictator game. (6) is nonlinear in inequality. The Bolton-Ockenfels (2000) model is 
therefore the FS model with nonlinear inequality aversion.  
 
Consider application of the model to the DG. The dictator’s objective is to maximize 
(6) subject to i jx x N  , which gives 
 
* 2
* 2
1
2
1
2
i
i
i
i
j
i
ax N N
b
ax N N
b
 
 
 
 
The first problem with the solution is obvious. Pay-offs are non-linearly related to the 
size of the pie. Whereas this may be seen desirable at very high values of N, 
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experiments with relatively higher N show that outcomes are not too sensitive to the 
value of N (Camerer 2003).  
 
Whereas this model can explain interior solutions in the standard dictator game, it 
cannot adequately explain variety of the dictator games played (the V-test). For 
example consider the DG where individual i and j are given 10 dollars each. The 
dictator is given the option of either sharing his/her 10 dollars with the recipient or 
taking some of the recipient’s money.  The BO model will give the same solution as the 
standard DG. These games do not give the same results in practice. Similarly, Camerer 
(2003, p. 111) notes that if you modify the UG such that when the Responder rejects a 
proposal, the monetary payoffs are 10 per cent of the original offer,  relative shares will 
be the same no matter whether the responder accepts or rejects. Thus the responder will 
always accept any offer; no matter how unequal it is (since the utility from rejection 
will be lower than the utility with acceptance). This shows that the model fails to pass 
the V-test.  
 
It is a bit hard to work out how to implement the P-test here as the model is defined 
over pay-offs, not utility. One possibility is to think of xi and xj as utilities and replace 
xj with xj/The equilibrium value of *jx  is ambiguously related to but most 
probably decreasing in  which is against the spirit of psychological intuition.  
 
2.3. The CFG (Cox, Friedman and Gjerstad 2007) Model: 
The model is given by 
 
1
i i iV x x j
         where 1   
 0 ,i ir s      ,                    0,0 0   
 
where r is the reciprocity and s is the state variable. When r=s=0, 0i i   
0 as
 which 
could be positive, negative or zero, implying a benevolent, malevolent or selfish player. 
Consider application of the game to the dictator game with status. i i    . s=1 
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when individuals earn property rights to the sum N and 0 if the sum was manna from 
experimental heaven.  The dictator’s objective is to maximize 
   i i i iV x N x      
1   which gives * 1
1
1
1
i
i
x N
 
      
 and 
1
1
*
1
11
i
i
i
x N






      
. 
 
Notice that, depending upon the value of i , the model explains the corner as well as 
interior solution observed in laboratory experiments. 
 
Empirical estimates of the model in Cox et al (2007) yield 1   and a>0. This implies 
that 0idx
ds
 . Intuitively the dictator decreases his/her weight i  on utility of the 
recipient when s=1. This implies that the model passes the V-test. 
 
Cox et al (2007) empirically estimate the value of   and find that it is >0 and <1 in all 
empirical estimations. One concern, though, is that the estimated value of   changes in 
these estimations, which needs to be justified. To see if the model passes the P-test at 
the at Cox et al (2007) estimated value of  , let us consider an alternative scenario 
where the recipient is less efficient in deriving satisfaction from a unit of pay-off than 
the dictator. The model can be reproduced as: 
 
  1 ii i i N xV x

  
         
 
 
Maximization yields 
 
1
*
1
1 1
i
i
x N



 

 

 
      
 and  
 
1
1
*
1
1 1
i
j
i
x N


 

 

 
      
. Note that 
*
0j
dx
d   when 0< <1, implying that the dictator will be less altruistic towards the less 
efficient individuals, which is the opposite of what psychological intuition would 
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predict3. Thus the model fails the P-test at the estimated value of  . Qualification of 
the P-test requires  <0. A special case of  <0 is when  =- , the perfect 
complement case. This is further discussed in Appendix B.  

 
It will become clear later on that the CFG model with  <0 is a special case of the 
model proposed in this paper. 
 
 
3. Equity-bias: Equity vs Equality: 
Most of the inequity aversion models, with rare exceptions such as CFG, are models of 
inequality aversion than inequity aversion. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) note: 
 
“The determination of the relevant reference group and the relevant reference 
outcome for a given class of individuals is ultimately an empirical question. The 
social context, the saliency of particular agents, and the social proximity among 
individuals are all likely to influence reference groups and outcomes. Because in 
the following we restrict attention to individual behavior in economic experiments, 
we have to make assumptions about reference groups and outcomes that are likely 
to prevail in this context. In the laboratory it is usually much simpler to define what 
is perceived as an equitable allocation by the subjects. The subjects enter the 
laboratory as equals, they do not know anything about each other, and they are 
allocated to different roles in the experiment at random. Thus, it is natural to 
assume that the reference group is simply the set of subjects playing against each 
other and that the reference point, i.e., the equitable outcome, is given by the 
egalitarian outcome” (Fehr and Schmidt 1999, pp 821-22) 
 
This is where root of the problem lies, as it is assuming too much. Once the experimenter 
assigns subjects into different roles, through whatever procedure, and gives them unequal 
property rights, they cease to be equal. For example, a dictator with all the power to give 
something or nothing to another player is not equal to the passive recipient who has no 
claim over the sum to be divided. Similarly individuals come from different socio-
                                                 
3 This points towards issues related to the estimation procedures adopted in the paper, which is worth 
investigating but is outside the scope of the paper. 
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economic backgrounds and experiences. Thus it is unreasonable to assume that other-
regarding individuals are universally inequality averse irrespective of context. A 
reasonable postulation would be to think of one’s idea of equitable distribution as state-
dependent, where the state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. 
Whereas the psychological parameters include one’s valuation (in terms of socio-
economic status) of one’s self relative to other in the society and to those in the 
experiment and one’s perception about behavior of others in the experiment (kind, selfish 
etc)4, the structural parameters mainly relate to design of the experiment (such as how are 
different roles and property rights allocated, information about the socio-economic status 
of players, wording of the experiment, role of the experimenter etc).  
 
Let us define three different states, Fair (F), Superior (S), and inferior (INF). Given 
individual-specific psychological tendencies/parameters, every experimental design 
assigns one of the three states to players. When assigned a fair state, one’s idea of equity 
is a fair one (i.e. equal distribution); when assigned a superior state (S) or inferior (INF) 
states, one’s idea of equity is a biased one. Let Ei=xi/xj be the measure of equity of an 
individual i over xi (own pay-off) and xj (other’s pay-off). When i is assigned a fair state, 
F, his/her idea of an equitable state is a fair one, i.e. Ei=1. However, when assigned a 
biased state, S or INF, he/she is emotionally locked into choosing a biased Ei=1+bi where 
bi quantifies equity-bias. In state S bi>0 and i values more than fair distribution as 
equitable distribution. Similarly, bi<0 in state INF and i accepts less than fair 
distributions as equitable. In general 1iE ib   where  
 
  (7) 
0                                   when in state     F 
0                      when in state    S
1 0                    when in state   INF
i i
i
b b
b
     
 
For example, in the DG, a dictator is assigned a state superior than the one assigned to the 
recipient. The dictator owns all the money and is assigned the right to use it as he/she 
pleases. The recipient is neither a party to the “production” of value nor legally entitled to 
                                                 
4 This valuation is of course subject to behavioral instincts that are either hard-wired in human nature (such 
as self-serving bias) or evolved/learned as part of ones culture or environment. 
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have any share of the money5. Thus, when behaving altruistically, he/she doesn’t find it 
equitable to split the pay-offs, or utility, equally. Competition basically changes the 
relative location of players, and hence their idea of equitable share. Similarly, a recipient 
in the ultimatum game is assigned an inferior state, and may accept less than fair offers as 
equitable. This plays an important role in explaining dynamics of the outcomes in variety 
of the two games, and other games of the same sort, as we shall see later.  
 
4. The Model: 
With the above discussion in mind, let us write a generalized model of inequity aversion. 
Let  
ix    = pay-off of individual i 
 i iu x  = idiosyncratic selfish utility function of individual i from own pay-off ix  
 ,j i ju x
 
= selfish utility of individual j as perceived by individual i from pay-off  of 
individual j jx . 
ie  = the equitable distribution of utility as perceived by individual i  
Social utility of the individual i, Vi, is assumed to be increasing in  i iu x  and decreasing 
in advantageous inequity    i i i i ji jI u x e u x  . i.e.  
 
                       ,0i i i i i i i ji jV u x max u x e u x                          (8) 
where u >0, u >0, u , 0, 'i
'
ij
" 0i  "iju  '
'1
i
i
ij
i
i
u
e
u
       
 and i >1. 
 
The restrictions on the first and second derivatives of the idiosyncratic selfish utilities 
imply diminishing/constant marginal utility of money. i  is the social marginal utility of a 
                                                 
5 Even though it is possible for him/her to think of the sum as a result of the experiment to which the other 
player is also a party to some extent, which morally entitles him/her to some share. 
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unit decrease in advantageous inequity referred to as the social beta of individual i. The 
logic behind the value of i  and the restriction on i  will be justified later in the paper. It 
might however be helpful to point out that this restriction ensures that social utility is 
maximum at the equitable distribution of pay-offs. In the FS model this restriction was 
1/ 2i  , which in our notation is equivalent to 2
i
i
   with i >1. The restriction on i  
could be replaced with i >1 (as i >1 always implies '
'
1
1 e
i
ij
i
i
u
u
      
, see Appendix D 
for proof). In order to understand the dynamics generated by the value of social beta and 
its interpretation, I will stick to the general value of social beta as above. 
 
Let us further assume: 
 
  (9)   ki i iu x f x ix
 

    1 kjji j jj
i i i
j
x x
u x f f xg x f  
   
           
   
   (10) 
where 0  and  0 1ki
 
 if x  is the preference technology of individual i, which converts ix  into utility and 
 is the preference technology of individual j, as perceived by individual i, which 
converts 
 i jg x
jx  into the utility of j. The fact that the preference technology f may not 
necessarily be equal to g captures dynamics of differences in socio-economic status of 
players that leads to equity-bias in pay-offs. In the specification in equation (10), i  
embodies individual i’s belief about the socio-economic status of individual j relative to 
his/her own socio-economic status. For example, when individual i believes he/she is 
socially better off than individual j (say because of j’s disability or because j is poor 
relative to i), i  is greater than 1. i >1 implies that i believes that j is less efficient in 
deriving satisfaction from a dollar than i him/herself or a dollar given to j generates lesser 
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utility than it does to i (vise-versa for i <1). Appendix C derives the utility function in 
equation (8) as a monotonic transformation of a social utility function that explicitly 
models differences in socio-economic status6.  
 
Substituting (9) and (10) in (8)  gives 
 
        1,0
k
j          , 1
1
k k i
i i i i i i i
k
i
V x max x E x
E
      

     (11) 
where 1
k
i i
i
E e 
    
 
 
Recall that the restriction on i  ensures that social utility has a maximum, at the state-
dependent equitable distribution. Notice that the social beta is inversely related to , 
implying that for a relatively larger equity-bias, a relatively lower social beta is required 
for the social utility to have a maximum.  
iE
 
The players’ objective is to maximize (11) subject to i jx x N  . With the restriction on 
i  (see Appendix D) the problem reduces to minimization of the deviation of the inequity 
gap from zero,    kki i i jI x E x  , which occurs at 0iI   1ki i jx E x  . Thus 
equilibrium is the solution to the following two equations: 
 
0 equation                                    1ki i iI  jx E x  (12) 
and the budget constraint  i jx x N  (13) 
 
 and  
* *
1
1
1
j i
k
j
x N x N
E
        
 Solving (12) and (13) gives   
 
1
*
1
1
k
 
iE
i
k
i
x N
E
    
                                                 
6 Note that laboratory experiments are conducted in a controlled environment; it is possible for 
the impact of these problems to be minimized, if not completely avoided. When experiments are 
blind or double blind, self-serving bias may still be at play.  
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The solution is simply the intersection of 0iI   curve and the budget constraint, as 
shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
This equilibrium solution can also be arrived at using social utility or welfare functions 
taking a CES (Constant Elasticity of Substitution) form under conditions required to 
ensure conformity to the P-test. Appendix B derives and discusses the issue in detail. 
 
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium in the state-dependent equity-bias model of 
inequity aversion.  
xi  
 
 1kiE  is the equitable distribution of pay-offs (not utility) as perceived by individual i. 
The value of this is determined by equity-bias. When an individual is assigned a fair 
state, the value of  is equal to 1, when assigned a superior state >1 and when 
assigned an inferior state <1.  can be related to equity-bias,b , thus: 
iE iE
iE iE i
   
    1i iE b 
   1 1
k
i i
i
b e  
    
 
Without loss of generality k can be assumed to be equal to 1, which implies a constant 
marginal utility of money. It might be worth mentioning, however, that if desirable, one 
xj 
xi+xj=N 
1
k
i i jx E x      Ii=0 curve 
*
jx  
*
ix  
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can make k a function of N where k declines over income, continuously or continually, 
which will lead to decrease in offers when a player is in a superior state (Ei<1), and 
increase in offers when a player is in inferior state (Ei<1) when size of the pie increases. 
  
From here onwards, I will assume k=1 without loss of generality. 
 
Speaking of the two tests, the model passes the V-test as every design manifest itself in a 
unique value of equity-bias, which leads to a design or variety specific solution. Thus the 
model is general enough to accommodate variety in experiments and design. Also notice 
that 
*
0j
i
dx
d  , which is consistent with prediction of the P-Test. 
 
As a passing note, sometimes it might be easier to work with another version of the 
model as below (assume k=1): 
 
 ,0          1
2
i
i i i j i iV x max x x b N
         
  1,1ib    
 
Maximization subject to i jx x N   gives  0.5 1i ix b N   and  0.5 1j ix b N  , 
where  captures equity-bias. ib ib =0 means no equity-bias, ib >0 means positive equity-
bias and <0 means negative equity-bias. The paper will mainly stick to the 
specification in 

ib
(11) 
 
4.1  Application to the dictator game: 
Let D be pay-off of the dictator, and R be pay-off of the recipient. Based on equation (11), 
social utility of the dictator can be written as (k=1) 
 
 ,0D D DV D max D E R        (14) 
where 1D iE b  , 1
D
D
DE
    and 1D  . 
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The dictator’s objective is to maximize (14) subject to D+R=N. Equilibrium occurs at 
 
**
1
D
D
EDd
N E
     
 
 
Figure 4 plots VD at different values of D . The following holds for the upper panel: 
 
                   when 0
                   when when 0< 1        D<C<B
                    when 1
                    when 1                     E<D  
D
D
D
D
D
OAB
OAC
V
OAD
OAE




    
 
The solution can be summarized thus: 
 
 
    
1,0                                     when 0      (point B)
1,0                                     when 0< 1   (point C)* *,
*,1 , 1 *,0          when 1       (on line AD with indiff
D
D
D
D R
N N d d




        
 
erence)
*,1 *                           when 1        (on point E)Dd d 
  
 
where  *
1
D
D
Ed
E
  .  
 
As shown in Figure 4 (b), equilibrium requires ID=0. Figure 6 plots the equilibrium in ID 
and D space. The indifference curves have slope = D  and the budget constraint D+R=N 
is rewritten in ID and D space, which gives  D D DE D I E N  1 . Since, D >1, 
indifference curves are steeper than the budget constraint and the equilibrium is at the left 
corner at D* where ID=0. Notice that D* varies with ED. Similarly, when D <1 (not 
shown in the figure) indifference curves will be flatter than the budget constraint and the 
solution will lie on the right corner, where D*=N. D =1 is the solution with indifference. 
 22
  
Figure 4 :  (a)   plot of VD at different values of  D. The following holds 
                      
                   w hen  0
                   w hen  w hen  0< 1        D < C < B
                    w hen  1
                    w hen  1                     E < D   
D
D
D
D
D
O A B
O A C
V
O A D
O A E




    
                   (b)  Plot of the dictator’s inequity ID=D-EDR.  
 
Figure 5 : Equilibrium depicted in ID=D-EDR and D space with D >1 .  D*N is the budget 
constraint in ID and D space and the dotted lines are indifference curves. 
DV
O 
DI  N 
D 
N 
*
1
D
D
E N D
E
    
 
Indifference curves 
with 1D   
O 
 
A 
B 
E 
N 
D 
C 
0 1D   
0D 
1D 
 
1D   
(a) 
D 
 * 1 *R d N * *D d N I D
A 
O N 
D DI D E
(b) 
D 
R 
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 Theoretically D  can assume any value. Recall that we restricted it to be greater than 1 
( D >1) in the model. This is because it ensures unique interior solutions observed in the 
laboratory experiments at all values of k7. In fact, uniqueness of the solution requires 
 1k
1
1 DE


D , which is ensured by D >1 when  11
D
D
k
DE
 

(
1
D
D
DE
    when 
k=1). This is why we assumed this value of social beta in the model and restricted D  to 
be greater than unity. This is proved in proposition 2 below. 
 
Proposition 1: The equilibrium offer, 1-d*, made by the dictator varies with 
state-dependent equity-bias and can be anywhere between 0 and 1 inclusive. 
 
Proof:  As 1 11 *
1 2D D
d
E b
    . Theoretically, the equity-bias can take any positive 
or negative value. Thus, when the dictator’s valuation of equity is infinitely biased, the 
offer will be equal to zero (i.e.  1 *Db d 0    ). When the dictator’s valuation is 
negatively biased, say , the offer is equal to 1; 1Db   Db =0 means the dictator is in a fair 
state and splits the sum fairly, i.e. half-half. The less than infinitely equity-biased dictator 
in a superior state (i.e. ) will give offers in the interior  and 
the dictator in an inferior state with 
0 Db  
1 0Db
 0.5 1 * 0d  
    will lead to the interior solution in 
. Notice that I mainly define states and bias in terms of pay-offs. It is 
possible for these states to be different in terms of utility. Fr example, consider a fair state 
in utility (i.e. e
 0 1 * 0.d   5
i=1), which implies 
1
k
i
i
E 
    
 (Since 1
k
i i
i
E e 
    i
E).   could be less 
than, equal to or >1 (depending upon whether i  is greater, equal to, or less than one) 
which corresponds to positive, zero, and negative equity bias respectively. Thus one can 
                                                 
7 D >1 will give unique solution for all values of k, but D =1 will also give a unique solution when 
0<k<1. This is formally derived in Appendix D. 
 24
think of a dictator belonging to a superior state in utility and possibly belonging to any of 
the three states in pay-offs.  
 
Proposition 2: Any 0  is a unique equilibrium with *d 1  1 *D d     
 
Proof: For d* to be a unique equilibrium D  has to be greater than 1. Recall that  
1
D
D
DE
   .  d 
11 1 *
1D D DDE
       . The interpretation of this condition 
is straight forward. The dictator will keep reducing his/her own pay-offs so long as it 
increases his/her social-utility more than it hurts his/her selfish utility.  
 
The model clearly explains the corner as well as interior solutions observed during 
experiments. This model acknowledges that individuals are heterogeneous and differ in 
their valuation of equity; hence their social utility is maximized at different offers. This 
leads them to optimally offer different amounts.  
 
4.2 Application of the model to the Ultimatum Game: 
Now consider application of the model to the standard ultimatum game experiment. Let P 
be pay-off of the proposer and R be pay off of the responder. The utility function of the 
proposer and the responder can be written (using equation (11) with k=1) as: 
 
  ,0P P PV P Max P E R    (15) 
  ,0R R RV R max R E P    (16) 
 
The proposer’s objective is to maximize (15) subject to P+R=N.  The proposer’s offer 
will be equal to 1
1
O
P
R N
E
    
, leaving the responder an amount
1
O P
P
EP N
E
    
. If 
this offer is accepted by the responder, both will keep the positive sum; if rejected both 
will end up getting zero. The responder will accept the offer if it is greater than or equal 
to his/her social maximum. His/her social utility is maximum where his/her inequity 
R RI R E P   is =0. Thus the responder’s social utility will be maximum at 
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1
A R
R
ER N
E
    
, implying 1
1
A
R
P
E
N
    
, where the superscript A is added to denote 
the minimum acceptable offer level.8 Unlike the FS model (where responders are non-
optimizers and are happy with any offer that makes their social utility non-negative), here 
responders optimize their social utility and accept offer OR  if and only if O AR R , where 
AR  comes from maximization of his/her social utility. In case the offer is below his/her 
equitable minimum, he/she will reject the offer. This value could be the FS minimum 
acceptable offer or more than that depending upon the responder’s valuation of equitable 
distribution). 
 
Thus 
1     Accept offer when   R
0     Reject offer when   R
O A
O A
R
s
R
   
 
 
The solution will therefore be 
 
      
   1
0
s
 
*,1 *        when R
,
0                         when R
O AA A
O A
p p RP R
N N R s
            
 
where 0 *
1
P
P
Ep
E
     
1. 
 
Since in practice we may have agents with different equity-biases, let us capture this 
heterogeneity by expressing  of an individual of type n (=1,…..n) by , which is 
distributed with support and .  belongs to a responder with the highest 
minimum acceptable offer(
AP
AH
AH
AnP
P ALP AHP
R ) and  belongs to a responder with the lowest 
minimum acceptable offer(
ALP
ALR ). Thus the outcome of the experiment will depend on 
whom the proposer is playing with. Consider Figure 6, where the proposer’s utility is 
maximum at point A, where  and OP  OE OR NE . The equilibrium is: 
 
                                                 
A8 It is possible for some players to find RO R  offensive and reject them. I ignore such a possibility in 
discussions but the model does allow for such interpretations and solution. 
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   
   
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Figure 6: Equilibrium in the ultimatum game 
 
 
Of course, when E=C the proposer’s equitable offer will always be accepted irrespective 
of type of the responder. The (0,0) equilibrium implies that the proposer does not offer 
more than NE because he/she thinks it is inequitable and should be accepted by any 
responder; if not, he/she is happy to face the consequences. The responder, on the other 
hand, rejects the offer, believing that it is not equitable, and chooses to be worse-off than 
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accepting the inequitable distribution. The main reason for this rejection is that the offer 
is less than the minimum acceptable threshold. This rejection could be motivated by 
reciprocity, intentions, social punishment, self-assertiveness or any other reason. When 
rejections inflict monetary loss to proposers (as in the ultimatum game), all of these 
reasons could be in play. Impunity games narrow down the list to social punishment and 
self-assertiveness. See Appendix E for impunity and private impunity games. 
 
Proposition 3: Positive equilibrium offers will always occur where  
(i) a proposer locked into a superior state (positive equity-bias) 
is matched with a responder who is locked into an inferior 
state (negative equity-bias) and vise versa or  
(ii) both are locked into a fair state. 
 
Proof: Using our concept of equity-bias we postulated that 1iE ib   with >0 in a 
superior state, <0 in an inferior state and =0 in a fair state. Substituting this in the 
solution, we get (assume k=1 for simplicity) 
ib
* 11  
2
O
P
Rp N
N b
      
 
11  
2
A
A R
R
bRp N
N b
      
 
Equilibrium requires 1 1* Ap p    1 PR P
bb
b
    . Thus when the proposer is in 
superior state ( Pb >0), the responder will be in an inferior state ( <0) which is what is 
implied by proposition 3(i). Similarly when the proposer is locked into a fair state 
Rb
0Pb   
the responder must also be locked into a fair state ( =0) for an equilibrium pay-off to be 
positive. Intuitively, the proposer’s bias is defined over D/R; thus a superior state leads to 
a D/R greater than 1. The responder bias is defined over R/D. For D/R>1, R/D must be 
<1, which implies negative bias for the responder. Equilibrium also of course requires 
that for 
Rb
Pb  of proposer’s equity-bias, the responder’s bias must be at least  1 P P
b
b . 
Proposition 3 assumes that this condition holds.  
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This implies that every distribution in the ultimatum game with acceptance can be 
explained by a proposer and responder match that satisfies 
  1 1
1
OP
R
P
bb p
b
        Ap , and any equilibrium with rejection (P=R=0) can be 
explained as a punishment by the responder whose   1 11 O APR P
bb p
b
        p
                                                
. 
 
5. Application of the Model: 
As mentioned earlier, there are a variety of dictator and ultimatum games experimental 
economists have tested in the laboratory. Even though solutions of the model in this 
paper were derived for the standard dictator and ultimatum games, they can easily be 
applied to different designs, contexts and multiple player versions of these games. All we 
need to do is work out what impact would a particular innovation to an experimental 
design have on the relative state of players and for that matter their equity-bias and 
predictions about the solution follow intuitively9. The notion of equity-bias is general in 
nature and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, intentions, 
reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment role of the experimenter, etc. The 
model therefore provides a unified framework to understand the outcomes of research in 
a broader context.  
 
 
In the standard dictator game, the state assigned to a dictator is superior than the one 
assigned to the receiver. The recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor 
legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus it seems natural for the dictator to have a 
notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare and make offers in the interior. The 
ultimatum game introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it lowers the status 
of the dictator to a relatively inferior position by assigning him/her the role of a proposer. 
Secondly, it alleviates the status of the recipient to that of a responder who becomes an 
active partner to the creation of value. This arrangement leads to a reduction in equity-
 
9 Understandably, it may not be possible in some cases to predict what impact a particular innovation to an 
experimental design would have on the relative state of a player beforehand; experimental results could be 
used to understand the dynamics of such innovations on states. 
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bias of the dictator (now the proposer) and an improvement in equity-bias of the recipient 
(now responder). In a one-shot ultimatum game the proposer is in a relatively superior 
state than the responder (by just being the first mover), which allows for the possibility of 
less than fair splits as equitable offers. In a repeated ultimatum game their relative states 
converge to a fair state and the offers converge to an even split. Rejections in the 
ultimatum game occur when proposers make offers less than what is minimally 
acceptable to the responders as an equitable solution. There could be many reasons 
behind these rejections (to punish the proposer, reciprocity, social punishment, symbolic 
expression of anger, self-assertiveness etc), which can be isolated through experiments. 
 
The wording of the experiment and instruction list (Gary E. Bolton et al. 1998; Elizabeth 
Hoffman et al. 1999), identity of the experimenter, social distance, and design of the 
experiment seem to have an impact on the outcomes (Hoffman et al. (1994a, b). All these 
factors change the relative positions of players in the game, and hence their equity-bias, 
which show up in their offers and changes in the threshold for accepting or rejecting 
offers. Hoffman et al. (1994), for example, found reduction in offers by dictators when 
anonymity was increased, implying that anonymity increases equity-bias. This means that 
part of the altruism in the dictator game is to avoid being labeled as too selfish, to look 
good or not to look bad. Similarly, the experiment by Garza (2006) cited earlier, which 
introduces poverty in the dictator game, concludes that informing the dictator about the 
poverty of the recipient leads to more altruism. Again, this is because information about 
the socio-economic status of players leads to changes in relative states and equity-biases, 
which leads to different outcomes.  
 
Thaler (1995 p 216) mentioned that when instead of giving the dictator a sum as “manna 
from heaven”, if the dictator is made to feel as if he earned the right to the sum, then 
sharing shrinks. Making the dictator feel as if he/she earned the right to the sum basically 
changes his/her location to a relatively more superior (from superior to more superior) 
state, which leads to an increase in his emotional state of equity-bias. Similarly, Schotter 
et al. (1996) introduced property rights in two-stage-survival dictator and ultimatum 
games. In the first stage proposers were competing with each other in offering higher 
amounts to a single responder. They earn property rights to the sum when a proposer 
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accepts the responder’s offer. They move to the second stage with property rights they 
earned in the first state. In the second stage they offered lesser amounts and responders 
rejected smaller amounts less often. The offers were still significantly higher than zero 
and considered to be fair by player 2. This is because earning property rights in the 
second state increased the equity-bias of the proposers. The responders also made note of 
that and respected it by revising their lowest threshold (less biased). 
 
Similarly, structure/design of the experiment also plays a role. Consider two types of 
dictator games. (i) First, assume that the dictator is given $20 to share with another 
anonymous recipient. (ii) Second, consider the same two players now given 10 dollars 
each, with the dictator having the option of giving or taking away up to 10 dollars. Both 
experiments involve sharing 20 dollars but individuals are not located on the same 
position on the bias-chart. The dictator in (i) is in a more superior state than in (ii). Thus 
we will expect the share of the dictator in (ii) to be lower than, or at least as much as, in 
(i). Similarly, in ultimatum game we would expect the responder in (ii) to reject offers 
higher than in (i); this is because he/she is not in as inferior state in (ii) as he is in (i). The 
model also gives insight into why the hypotheses in experiments such as Bardsley (2005) 
are erroneous and provide a context for explaining results of his experiment. Bardsley 
hypothesized that the standard dictator game would give the same solution if the sum was 
instead distributed and the dictator was given the option of (giving and) taking money 
from the recipient. Arguing that the dictator is facing a similar problem of allocating the 
same budget, optimal allocation should be the same. The key assumption in Barsley’s 
argument is that preferences of the dictator are the same in the two experiments. The 
model in this paper postulates that preferences are state-dependent and the two models 
belong to two different states; expecting it to give the same solution is simply wrong. 
 
An increase in competition on the proposer’s side is expected to reduce the proposer’s 
equity-bias, leading to relatively larger offers and increasing the responder’s equity-
bias,leading to rejection of relatively larger offers. However, if proposers were to 
compete for lowest offers, the proposer’s equity-bias is expected to increase, leading to 
smaller offers, and that of the responders is expected to move further away from fair 
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offers, leading them to accept relatively lower offers. This holds only if the responders 
are aware of the nature of the competition. Thaler (1995) writes 
 
A good general theory of fairness predicts that fair-minded players behave self-interestedly 
in some situations. Two experiments show that competition can push ultimatum offers 
closer to zero, in ways consistent with fairness. Schotter et al. (1994) created competition 
among Proposers. Eight Proposers made offers in a first stage. The four who earned the 
most in the first-stage game could then play a second-stage game (with a different player). 
Sensible fairness theories would say that Proposers now have an excuse for making low 
offers-they must compete for the right to play again-so low offers are not as unfair, and 
Responders will accept them more readily. That is what happened. 
 
Information asymmetry may also play its role in positioning players on the state/bias 
chart and so may intentions. About the role of intentions in rejections in ultimatum 
games, Fehr and Schmidt (2005) conclude “Taken together, the evidence from Blount 
(1995), Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996), Offerman (1999), Brandts and Sola (2001) and 
Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000a, 2000b, 2003) supports the view that subjects want to 
punish unfair intentions or unfair types. Although the evidence provided by the initial 
study of Blount was mixed, the subsequent studies indicate a clear role of these motives.”  
 
Similarly, in experiments by Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) where subjects had to divide 
100 chips in an UG, chips were convertible to monetary pay-offs at different prices 
across players. For example in one treatment responders’ chips were valued 10 cents each 
and that of proposers 30 cents each. Players knew their own conversion rate but not 
necessarily that of others. When the proposer is aware that his/her chips are valued three 
times more than that of the responder, an equal monetary split would require the proposer 
to give 75 chips to the responder. When the information was available to responders, they 
rejected unequal money splits more frequently than when they were not aware of the 
difference in chips’ money value. Thus unequal proposals were rejected at higher rates 
than unintentional unequal proposals (Fehr and Schmidt 2005). Similarly, another 
important insight of the experiment was that proposers offered close to 50 percent when 
there was information asymmetry. This implies that proposers prefer to seem fair than be 
fair. Thaler (1995) believes this is an important reminder that self-interested behavior is 
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alive and well, even in ultimatum games. This also points towards an important 
distinction between altruism/fairness as a natural instinct and altruism/fairness as a code 
or altruism as an instinct complemented by religious or moral affiliations.  
 
This could intuitively be predicted by the model as well. Information asymmetry in this 
experiment positions proposers in a relatively superior state and they make offers closer 
to 50% than 75%. This is when they prefer to seem fair than act fair. What the model also 
predicts is that individuals with commitment to moral codes through say religious or 
cultural affiliations would push offers closer to the 75%. Information asymmetry should 
as such not change their relative state. It will be interesting to investigate whether or not 
individuals with different religious affiliation would behave differently. 
 
Similarly it can be shown that the model framework in this paper explains the wide 
variety of data in laboratory experiments such as Blount (1995) and Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher (2003). The framework also provides a rationale for the three-player games 
by Guth and Damme (1998), Kagel and Wolf (2001), and Berby-Meyer and Nuedereke 
(2005) by invoking player and design-specific equity bias. 
 
6. Conclusions: 
This paper takes note of the variety and multiplicity of models of other-regarding 
preferences proposed in experimental economics and points towards the need for certain 
criteria to judge these models. The paper identifies two tests, the Variety Test (ability of a 
model to explain outcomes under variety or alternative scenarios) and the Psychological 
Test (ability of a model to conform to psychological intuition), that can be used to judge 
any model of other-regarding preferences. It is argued that, for a mathematical model to 
qualify as a social welfare function, it must simultaneously pass the two tests. It is shown 
that none of the models proposed to date passes the two tests simultaneously with the 
exception of the Cox et al (2007) model which simultaneously passes the two test when 
some additional restrictions are imposed.  
 
This paper than proposes a generalized model of inequity aversion. The paper introduces 
the concept of equity-bias and postulates that one’s idea of equitable distribution is state-
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dependent where state is determined by psychological and structural parameters. The 
state could be fair, superior or inferior. When assigned a fair state, one’s valuation of 
equity is a fair one (even split), and when assigned a biased-state (superior or inferior) 
one’s valuation of equity is a biased one. i.e. bias in state leads to bias  in equity. 
Individuals in a fair state have zero equity-bias and split the pie evenly. Those in a 
superior (inferior) state have positive (negative) equity-bias and value more (less) than a 
fair distribution as an equitable distribution. Given the psychological tendencies/state of 
an individual, every experimental design assigns one of the three states to the player, 
which leads to individual-specific valuation of equity. Predictions about outcomes in 
different experiments, or the same experiment with different designs, can be made 
through predicting its impact on equity-bias.  
 
The model is more general than its previous counterparts. It parsimoniously explains 
interior solutions in the dictator game and provides a framework to understand outcomes 
in other experiments. It provides a framework to understand why outcomes change with 
design of the experiment and across different experiments of the same nature. All we 
need to do is work out what impact would a particular innovation to an experimental 
design have on the relative states of players, and for that matter their equity-bias, and 
prediction about its impact on outcomes intuitively follow. The notion of equity-bias is 
general in nature and embodies all information related to socio-economic status, 
intentions, reciprocity, social distance, design of the experiment, role of the experimenter, 
etc. The model therefore is all-encompassing and provides a unified framework to 
understand outcomes of research in a broader context.  For example, in the standard 
dictator game, the state assigned to the dictator is superior than the one assigned to the 
receiver. This is because the recipient is neither a party to the creation of value, nor 
legally entitled to any share in the sum. Thus it seems natural for the dictator to have a 
notion of equity that is biased towards his/her welfare. The standard ultimatum game 
introduces two changes to the dictator game. Firstly, it assigns the dictator the role of the 
proposer, which reduces his/her superiority and secondly, it alleviates the status of the 
recipient to that of a responder who becomes an active partner to the creation of value. 
This arrangement leads to reduction in the equity-bias of the dictator (now the proposer) 
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and increase in the equity-bias of the recipient (now the responder). Thus the fear of 
rejection, along with other factors, changes equity-bias of the players, hence equitable 
distribution. This is the main reason why offers in the dictator game are positive but 
lower than in the ultimatum game. Competition changes the relative position of the 
players and their valuation of equitable distribution. So does the design of experiments, 
such as the way property rights are assigned (e.g. earned or manna from heaven), the 
wording of the experiment/instructions, role of the experimenter etc. 
 
The framework in this paper is simple and doesn’t require individuals to process complex 
information. It rationalized all kind of choices, smart or otherwise, as state-dependent 
other-regarding utility maximizing outcomes. Policy makers can benefit from 
understanding the evolution of relative states and equity biases. Research therefore 
should be directed to unfold the dynamics and evolution of equitable states relevant to 
policy debates. The framework can also be used to understand the outcomes of other 
games, such as public good and trust games.  
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APPENDIX A: Another example of linear-model with inequality  
Charness-Rabin (quasi-maximin preferences) can be written as under (in a two player 
envoirment) 
  1i iU x W      
    1 2 1 2min , 1W x x x    x  
This implies 
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- 1
1 1
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 
 
    
 and   11 1i
      
. The model reduces to Fehr and 
Schmidt’s 1999 model with 0i  . i.e. 
    max ,0  i i i i jV x x x     
The fact that 0i   makes the model inferior under the specification as it would give 
corner solution in both the dictator game as well as the ultimatum game.  
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APPENDIX B: CES Welfare Function VS the base case model. 
In general a CES welfare function takes the following form 
  1 1i i i iV x  jx      (17) 
Maximizing (17) subject to i jx N   gives
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, the solution will be exactly the same as implied 
by equations (13), (12) with 1ik   .  
 
Let us now consider if this function passes the P-test.  
Maximizing  1 1 ji i i i
i
x
V x

  
          
 subject to i jx x N  gives (after substituting i ) 
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

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        
 
Passing P-test requires 
 **
0j
i
d x
d   which is true only when 01

   which requires 
 >1, or  <0.  >1  is irrelevant as the solution only applies to  <1 (when preferences 
are convex). Thus, the relevant restriction on the CES utility function would be  <0.  
 
A special case of  <0 is when    . This is the perfect complement case.  
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In general the following social welfare function with Leontief preferences technology 
will generate exactly the same solution as the original model. 
   min ,
k
k j
i i i
i
x
V x e 
        
 
Maximization in this case subject to budget constraint requires    1 1jk ki i i
i
x
jx e E
    
x  
which is exactly the same as the Ii=0 equation.  This together with the budget constraint 
will give you exactly the same solution the base case model. The figure below plots 
equilibrium in this case and shows that it satisfies the P-test. 
 
 
Figure 7: Equilibrium when social welfare/utility function takes the 
perfect complement form  
xi  
 
When 0  ,      ln 1 lni i i i    jxV x  which is log transformation of the Cobb-
Douglas function. The Cobb-Douglas function fails to pass the P-test as 
 **
0j
i
d x
d  . 
xj 
1
i     1ki i jx e x    
*
jx  
*
ix  
 N 
N **jx  
**
ix  
1
i     1ki i jx E x    
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APPENDIX C: Derivation of the main model. 
Assume the individual i has the following social utility function 
 , 0ji ii i i i i ij
i i i i ij ij
xx xV u max u e u
w w
  
                     w
'
iu
'
iju
" 0i  "iju 
 
>0, >0, u , 0, 
'
'1
i
i
ij
i
i
u
e
u
       
 and i >1. 
w stands for wealth and   quantifies the efficiency/inefficiency with which individuals 
convert pay-offs into utility. The subscript ij on represents individuals i belief about 
individual j since i doesn’t have perfect information about j’s utility, wealth and 
efficiency. 
 
Notice that selfish utility is determined by pay-off relative to wealth which basically 
acknowledges the fact that a dollar received by a wealthier person generates lesser utility 
than when it is received by a poor person. The parameter   is there to capture 
heterogeneity in preference technology. When i ij   individual i is more efficient in 
converting a dollar into utility than individual j (because of some socio-economic feature 
other than wealth, say disability). This specification therefore acknowledges socio-
economic status as one of the determinant of selfish utility generated by pay-offs.   
 
Let us assume the selfish utility functions are homogeneous of degree k in its arguments. 
We can re-write the social utility function as under 
 ,0
kk k
ji i
i i i
i i i i ij ij
xx xV max e
w w w
  
                      
 
Multiplying both sides by  and substitute  ki iw   ki i i iw V V    and ij iji
i i
w
w
 
      
, we get 
    , 0
k
k k j
i i i i i
i
x
V x m ax x e 
          
 
Which is the model in the paper. As argued, i  in the model captures individual i’s 
valuation of his/her socio-economic status relative to that of individual j.  
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APPENDIX D: Derivation of the Restriction on Social Beta 
 As  
      ,0i i i i i i i ij jV u x max u x e u x       
Differentiating  w.r.r ix , we get (assume 
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We know , so the social utility has positive slope when . For the point 
 to be the unique maximum, the social utility must decline when . Thus 
' >0iu i iu e u
i iu e u
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i iu e u
i
i
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dx
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. Thus, if we assume 
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 
     
i,   has to be greater than 1 for the 
condition to be satisfied. i  can also be equal to 1 when '' 0iu   and  ( i.e. 
diminishing marginal utility in pay-offs). 
'' 0iju 
i  must be greater than 1 in case of constant 
marginal utilities i.e. u u . ''  ''i ij 0
 
The condition can further be simplified as well. Proposition 2 shows that this condition is 
equivalent to *1i ix    which will always hold when 1i  . Thus the model will still 
give the same solution if we replace 
1
'
'
1 iji i
i
u
e
u

         
 condition with 1i   for 
simplicity. 
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APPENDIX E: Application to Impunity and Private Impunity Games: 
Rejections in the ultimatum game are normally interpreted as the responder’s punishment 
to the proposer. This behaviour is explicitly modeled in many studies in the form of 
“inequality aversion” by Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Reciprocity (Falk & Fischbacher, 
2006), intentions by Rabin (1993). Whether or not rejections in the ultimatum games are 
punishment can be ascertained through impunity game. Impunity game is similar to the 
ultimatum game but rejections reduce pay-off of the responders to zero only, the proposer 
keeps his/her share. This game basically restrains the responder’s ability to punish the 
proposer’s inequitable and unkind offers. Rejections in this case lead to increase in 
inequality. Inequality aversion and reciprocity therefore cannot explain rejection in the 
impunity game. This game is not very well researched and need some more attention. 
Recently Horita and Yamagishi (2007) conducted experiments on impunity game and 
concluded that a substantial proportion of participants rejected extremely unfair offers 
which was about half of the rejections in ultimatum game.  (Bolton & Zwick (1995): 
nearly 0 %, Fukuno & Ohbuchi (2001): 30.8%, read these references as well). Horita, and 
Yamagishi (2007) interpret rejections in the impunity game as a “social punishment” or 
symbolic expression of anger with reference to the the experiments of Fukuno& Ohbuchi, 
2001; Güth & Huck(1995); Xiao and Houser (2005).  
 
Horita and Yamagishi (2007) introduced another innovation to the impunity game. In 
the impunity game the proposer is informed of the responder’s rejection. Horita and 
Yamagishi (2007) makes the responders decision private (the proposer is not informed) 
and call it private impunity game. The proposer is unaware that the responder has any 
rejection power. The proposer believes as if he/she is a dictator. Responders know that 
proposers will not be informed of their decision. Rejections in the private impunity 
game cannot be used as “social punishment”. Horita and Yamagishi (2007) experiments 
conclude that a substantial proportion of responders rejected unfair offers even in the 
private impunity game. They interpret these rejections as “Self-assertiveness” based on 
post-experiment questionnaire responses. Given that the experimenter is made aware of 
the responder’s decision, the rejections in the private impunity game can also be 
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interpreted as showing symbolic expression of anger through the experimenter or not to 
belittle oneself in the eyes of the experimenter. 
 
Assuming the evidence in impunity or private impunity game is robust, can the model 
in this paper explain rejections in these games. The answer is, yes it does. The 
responder reject offers if they are less than their acceptable minimum. This rejection 
could be motivated by reciprocity, intentions, social punishment, self-assertiveness or 
any other. When rejections inflict monetary loss to proposers (as in the ultimatum 
game) all of these reasons could be in play. Impunity games reduce narrow down the 
list to social punishment and self-assertiveness. 
 
